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ABSTRACT

Trans-boundary Rivers form an important context for relations between multiple sovereign
states. The paper tackles the dynamics of a state’s behaviour, regarding trans-boundary Rivers,
through time so that state relations are not a constant competition or cooperation. The paper
responds to the behavioural changes amongst states by adopting a constructivist approach. By
using constructivist approach, this paper argues that legal norms are generated through
interactions and communications between states. Multiple criteria include political, geographic,
economic, and legal contexts determine state relations. The Indus and Euphrates basins
demonstrate how legal norms are determined by each state subject to their geographic, economic
and political conditions. The paper concludes that the economic interest is a key variable towards
cooperation between riparian states. The most significant message of the thesis, obviously, if the
national interests of states in question are willing to explore common ground of incentives,
particularly economic incentives between riparian states, then cooperation will be more likely.
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I.

Introduction:

Water is an indispensable resource for the survival of human beings. Industrial fields,
agricultural domains and domestic uses all rely primarily upon this resource. This is a principal
need that is shared across the states nation.1 The reasonable allocation of, access to, and control
over quantitatively adequate amounts of water is not only a matter of political boundaries, but is
ultimately tightly linked to social, economic and geographic variables of states.
Water scarcity is one of the key challenges facing the world. As the global population grows and
demands for food and energy increase, the need for fresh water will intensify. The continuing
availability of water governs the ability of states to produce economic growth, poverty reduction,
as well as conflict reduction and climate change adaptation.2 Consequently, the need for
freshwater storage will become even more important.
Increasing storage and diversion of shared water rivers, according to the World Commission on
Dams, has been a considerable basis of tension among states.3 The emergence of non
navigational purposes of international rivers leads to an increasing competition around the rights
and duties of each state to benefit from its natural resources. Since international rivers flow
through several borders of states and its movement at any stage has consequences upon other
states, the question of distribution and use of shared rivers is of utmost importance for riparian
states.
Dams require cooperation between states for their construction because the methodology of the
water diversion needs to be equitable. For example, the Euphrates basin has witnessed drastic
reductions in water flow in recent years primarily due to excessive Turkish hydro power projects.
There have been disputes between Turkey, Syria and Iraq concerning water distribution. When
the downstream states (Syria and Iraq) objected to the Turkish hydropower, the Turkish
government argued that it has sovereign rights over their natural resources.4

1

UNESCO, BASIN WATER ALLOCATION PLANNING. PRINCIPLES, PROCEDURES AND APPROACHES FOR BASIN
ALLOCATION PLANNING (2013) available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0022/002208/220875e.pdf
2
See, UNITED NATIONS, WORLD WATER DEVELOPMENT REPORT: WATER FOR PEOPLE, WATER FOR LIFE EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY (2003), available at www.un.org/esa/sustdev/publications/WWDR_english_129556e.pdf
3
WORLD COMMISSION ON DAMS, DAMS AND DEVELOPMENT, A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR DECISION-MAKING, ( 2000)
available at http://www.unep.org/dams/WCD/report/WCD_DAMS%20report.pdf
4

Murat Hakki, Borders and Boundaries in International Law, cross-Border Water Conflicts In Mesopotamia: An
Analysis According To International Law, 13 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISP.RESOL.245 (2005).

At the same time, experience suggests that disputes over shared water can be resolved and
cooperation can be achieved even where disagreements in other spheres of international relations
remain unresolved.
An ideal example of water sharing is the Indus basin. Here, complete dependency upon finite
fresh water supply, and challenges to that supply were coupled with political instability between
India and Pakistan.5 Despite the reality of cooperation in the Indus basin appears even more
unusual, India and Pakistan signed the Indus Water Treaty in 1960. This agreement was the most
successful agreement in the nineteenth century.
In response to this phenomenon, I analyze the role of the UN watercourses convention in shaping
the behavioral relations among states. The question arises: how international legal principles
assist political change between the states riparian to an international river.
The UN Watercourses Convention creates a general framework for the management of
international watercourses. The convention has adopted “regulated sovereignty” that enables
each state to have a sovereign right to use water without causing harm to the other riparian states.
The equitable use principle has led to a new understanding of the state sovereignty theory, given
that the dominant old theories of sovereignty had proved unable to support and enhance
cooperative management of water resources. The convention has adopted new rules and
dismantled the old absolute sovereignty theories. However, what is considered an equitable share
of the waters of an international river is a complex assessment.
The equitable use of states must be determined in each individual case and depends upon
multiple criteria, none of which has inherent priority. These criteria range from the geography,
economic, social, and demographic factors, to existing uses or availability of alternative
resources. The amount of water constituting an equitable share often varies among states.
In my viewpoint, the new innovation of regulated sovereignty is still determined by how parties
perceive it. It appears at first that the equitable norm leaves up to riparian states to weighting the
criteria of water sharing that leads to conflictive interests among riparian states. There is no norm
to follow in determining a priority of uses. Accordingly, the riparian states adopt the legal
argument that is most favorable to each. For example, states with existing uses, specifically the
5

Kathleen Hogan, The Norms of Water-Sharing: Cooperation along a Continuum, YALE J. INT’L.AFFAIRS, vol.1,
iss.1, 2005.
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downstream states, prefer the resolution to stem from the significant harm principle. In the same
vein, upstream neighbors however, argue in favor of the equitable use principle. The question
arises: how the legal domain affects political change amongst riparian states. My aim is to
explore factors that have derived to competition and cooperation on water distribution between
states. In doing so, I tackle the important bridge between international relations and international
law disciplines. I intended to focus on the constructivist approach to give plausible explanations
to the changes of a state’s behaviour regarding trans-boundary rivers.
The central question arises: does international politics really matter in international law? The
study of international relations is an effort to understand the means and conditions, which states
cooperate with one another. In the international relations field, there are multiple explanations
that could derive to competitive or cooperative manner. Interpretations varied from power shared
approaches to the power of shared understandings among communities. According to power
approach, the powerful state, “strength is defined as a state military power, control of
headwaters, and position in the international community, or a combination of these attributes,
will take the lead in establishing any sharing regime.”6
I invoke the power shared approaches. The power approach cannot explain why India, by far the
larger and stronger of the Indus states, accepted the division of the Indus river flow. Had India
acted in accordance with its strength, it would have used its control of the headwaters to deny
water flow to Pakistan. One of the apparent gaps in the power shared approaches is that they
cannot give concrete explanations to the transformations in the cooperative or competitive nature
of trans-boundary Rivers. In this paper, I apply the constructivist approach to explain the
behavioral changes of states regarding international rivers.
Constructivist approach focuses on interactions, communications among state actors.7
Participation in an international legal regime can actually alter the identities and interests of
states. I mean by identity how states perceive themselves and the others. I contend that legal
norms are subjectively determined by each state, subject to their social, economic, and political
conditions. The legal aspect cannot translate solely the cooperative or competitive nature of
trans-boundary Rivers. Without sufficiently interactions between participants in the legal system;
6

Hogan, supra note 5.
STEFANO GUZZINI & ANNA LEANDER, CONSTRUCTIVISM AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: ALEXANDER WENDT
AND H IS CRITICS, (Routledge 2005).
7
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legal rules will remain, or become deadlock. I believe that the legal aspect is not fully
autonomous. Various factors interact to determine the cooperative and competitive behavior
between states. There are multiple variables that interact to influence the legal regime. I
emphasize that law is one vital factor as legal principles are the products of state actions. Law
entitles independent normative force that should not be ignored. Others include political
relations, economic, geographic, and social. Law has the ability to combine all these factors in
order to regulate behavior between riparian states.
In addition, the analysis of historical representations helps us to understand how social,
economic, political aspects are produced. History has a central role in determining state
identities. In the process of state identities construction; the national interests of states are the
driving force in order to reach a common ground of cooperative incentives among riparian states.
For instance, an offer of financial incentives is occasionally able to circumvent impasses in
negotiations. This variable, among others, helped in resolving the Indus dispute.
This paper is divided into three parts. The first chapter introduces the conceptual framework of
the international water law. It discusses the general principles and doctrines of international law
of water resources; it describes the international state practice, the roles of the principles of state
sovereignty over natural resources in the utilization of international water resources. The chapter
observes that international water resources law does not and cannot offer an authoritative
definition of rights and obligations or specific prescriptions for the equitable utilization of the
waters of an international basin.
The second chapter presents a constructivist approach to explaining Water sharing relationships.
Constructivist approach is best suited to the analysis of how identities and interests can change
over time. Identities of states are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature.
Constructivist approach assumes that interactions and communications among state with shared
understandings led to the emergence of legal norms. Legal norms are subjectively determined by
each state, subject to their social, economic and political conditions. Constructivist approach
assists to determine how legal principles could lead to competition and cooperation.
Chapter three examines the degree of cooperation and competition among the basin states in
recognizing the waters through the Indus and Euphrates rivers, using the framework outlined in
chapter two. The development of knowledge about trans-boundary rivers is related to examine
how parties perceive it.
4

The chapter traces the initial approach of the riparian states in using the river and the evolution
and outcome of these efforts. The chapter addresses the interaction between geographic, social
economic, political, and legal variables, which lead to a different degree of cooperation and the
adherence to law throughout the case studies. These variables have assisted to reshape both the
identities and interests of state actors moving them toward a different degree of cooperative
behavior.

5

II.

The Conceptual framework of the international water law:

In this chapter, I present a portrait of the normative framework of international water law that
demonstrates its definition, features, and nature. My aim here is to tease out the legal principles
of international watercourses as a means of settling international water disputes. By design, I
emphasize the features of the UN watercourses convention in order to determine the impact of
legal principles in state relations.
A. What is meant by International Water Law?
International water law forms the basis of formal conventions, state practices, and decisions of
international tribunals of state relations. The practices of states which have emerged from a sense
of legal commitment confer duties upon riparian states. As a consequence, international tribunals
might have been taken as evidence that states consider a particular rule to be a legal
commitment. The body of rules developed by international water law offers a range of means
and mechanisms to states for dispute avoidance and dispute settlement.
Central to the principles that have evolved in the area of international water law are those
principles embedded in the UN watercourses convention for non-navigational uses. This
convention adopted in 1997 provides a general scheme of water management among riparian
states regarding apart from navigational aspects. The scope of international water law, which I
emphasize in this paper, is the UN watercourses convention as the principal and only universal
treaty in this area of international relations.
Despite the UN convention of watercourses is considered a remarkable development; the
difficulties encountered in negotiating this convention are reflected in its vague operative
principles. Before I turn to the problematic issue of the UN watercourses convention, I present
the development of international law theories in order to determine the potential link between
substantive principles and state sovereignty.
B. The Evolution of international law theories:
Although water issues have been very common in the past; developments in international law to
address such disputes have been very modest, often requiring states to resolve such concerns on
their own. There are substantive principles that have acquired a normative status in state practice.
Over the years, dispute around international rivers have emerged from differing interpretations of
the question of sovereignty. States, traditionally, have enjoyed an absolute right to use water
resources within their territories. Generally speaking, upstream states claim an exclusive right
6

over their water resources without regard to downstream riparian. Downstream states, contrarily,
claim an absolute territorial integrity, which grants an exclusive right to the natural flow of the
river from the territory of upstream riparians. According to this approach, upstream states cannot
develop any projects that affect the quantity or quality of water that flows down the watercourse.
Historically, upstream and downstream riparian states have promoted extreme and self interested
theories to enhance their sovereign rights over natural resources.
History has shown that absolute theories have been used as strong bargaining positions. Friedrich
Berber asserted that such claims “are based upon an individualistic and anarchical conception of
international law in which personal and egotistical interests are raised to the level of guiding
principles and no solution is offered for the conflicting interests of the upper and lower
riparian.”8
Recently, the more compromised concept of limited territorial sovereignty is widely accepted.
The concept has balanced between sovereign rights of states and the management of
international water resources. The principle centered on the theme that all states have the right of
utilizing watercourses without causing harm to other neighboring states.9 Fundamentally, there is
a community of interest encourages riparian states to take joint actions to use their natural
resources.10
1. Absolute sovereignty principles:
According to the reasoning behind this principle, a state may adopt all measures suitable to its
national interest regarding international rivers regardless of their effects beyond its boundaries.
The Harmon Doctrine is considered the oldest principle concerning water disputes. It is also
known as the theory of absolute territorial sovereignty.11 The Harmon Doctrine was named after
the previous United States Attorney General Hudson Harmon. In 1890, a dispute arose between
the Mexican government and the United States about diverting water from the Rio Grande to the
8

Joseph Dellapenna, Rivers as Legal Structures: The Examples of the Jordan and the Nile, NAT. RESOURCES J.,
Vol.36, 218-249 (1996). (discussing the evolution of international law theories).
See, Chusei Yamada, 3rd Report on Shared Natural Resources: Transboundary Ground waters, IN’L LAW COMM’N,
U.N Doc. A/CN.4/551/2005.
9
Hesham Abdul Hamid, A Study on the Concept of International River in International Water Law and Its
Applications in Nile Basin Agreements, AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES, Vol. 11, Iss.39, 41-49 (2013)
10
Beatriz Garcia, Exercising a Community of Interests: A Comparison between the Mekong and the Amazon Legal
Regimes, Vol 39, no 2, HKLJ, (2009).
11
Stephen McCaffrey, The Harmon doctrine One Hundred Years Later: Buried, Not Praised, NAT. RESOURCES J.,
Vol.36, no3, 550-569 (1996).
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detriment of the Mexicans downstream.12 This case caused debate about the international legal
obligations resulting from the no harm rule.13The doctrine affirmed that a state has an absolute
right to utilize its natural resources within its respective territories and cannot be exposed to
international legal liability for any damage caused to the other state riparian.14 This is a classical
approach defended by upstream states in order to serve their national interest at the discretion of
other state riparian.
Despite this doctrine not having much acceptance in the international community, this doctrine
was followed by some states. The approach was exercised to support the American utilization of
the Rio Grande River that separates the United States of America from Mexico. India, in 1948,
temporarily interrupted the flow of the river from India to Pakistan based upon absolute
sovereignty doctrine. According to Caponera, this theory failed to accept the dual character of a
state that territorial sovereignty is a source of responsibilities as well as rights.15 This principle,
however, has proven to be highly impracticable and has not received an acceptance among
international community since it ignores the rights of other riparian states that share the same
resource.
In some formulations, the theory of absolute territorial integrity holds that nations are entitled to
expect fixed flows of water within their territories from upstream states.16More specifically,
upstream states are not able to utilize the river if it will cause injury to downstream states. The
limited territorial integrity is the counter argument to the absolute sovereignty of upstream states.
The approach places an obligation on the upper riparian states; however, it does not entitle any
mutual obligation upon downstream states. The doctrine was invoked by Egypt, Pakistan, and
Bangladesh in the 1950, which are the downstream states.17 The doctrine gives a veto right of
downstream states to prohibit upstream states from any excessive use without the consent of the

12

McCaffrey, supra note 10, at 257
Salman M. A. Salman, The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives
on International Water Law, INT’L J. WATER RESOURCES, Vol. 23, No. 4, 625–640 (2007).
14
Albert E. Utton, Which Rule Should Prevail in International Water Disputes: That of Reasonableness or that of
No Harm? NAT. RESOURCES J., Vol. 36, 636 (1996).
15
DANTE CAPONERA, NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW AND ADMINISTRATION: SELECTED WRITINGs,
(Patricia Wouters, ed., 2013).
16
Albert E. Utton, International Water Quality Law, NAT. RESOURCES J., Vol. 13, 283-311 (1973).
13

17

GEBRE DEGEFU, THE NILE: HISTORICAL, LEGAL AND DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVES (Trafford Publishing
2003).
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downstream states.18 The existence of such a veto right was claimed by Spain in the Lac Lanoux
arbitration. France could not proceed with the planned diversion of the river without Spain’s
prior consent. However, as was observed by the tribunal, giving a veto right to would mean
revoking sovereign right of one state at the discretion of another. The tribunal did not consider
Spain’s argument because the diversion did not result in harm as France undertook to replace all
the displaced water .The tribunal concluded that “if it is admitted that there is a principle which
prohibits the upstream State from altering the waters of a river in such a fashion as seriously to
prejudice the downstream State, such a principle would have no application to the present case
because …… the French scheme will not alter the water in question.”19
These traditional doctrines equally deny that sovereignty presupposes duties as well as rights.
State sovereignty cannot be exercised in isolation because activities of one state may have a
significant impact on sovereign rights of co- riparian states. So, the principle of territorial
sovereignty finds its limitations where acts of one state touch upon the territorial integrity of
another state. In the words of Oppenheim ''A state, in spite of its territorial supremacy, is not
allowed to alter the natural conditions of its own territory to the disadvantage of the natural
conditions of a neighboring State ,for instance, to stop or to divert the flow of a river”.20
Consequently, actions of states arising from the principle of sovereignty are determined by such
principles such as state responsibility for actions causing transboundary injury. In the Island of
Palmas Case awarded in 1928, it was a case involving a territorial dispute over the Island of
Palmas between the Netherlands and the United States which was heard by the Permanent Court
of Arbitration. The arbitrator Huber, who was then president of the Permanent Court of
International Justice, stated that “territorial sovereignty involves the exclusive right to display the
activities of a state. This right has a corollary a duty: the obligation to protect within the territory
the rights of other states”.21The most controversial question is the scope of the restrictions
imposed by international law upon a state's sovereignty in the use of trans-boundary rivers.

18

TRILOCHAN UPRETI, INTERNATIONAL WATERCOURSES LAW AND ITS APPLICATION IN SOUTH ASIA, (Pairavi
Prakashan2006).
19
Lac Lanoux (Spain v. France), 12 R.I.A.A.281 (Nov.16, 1957).
See, Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution, DUKE L.J., Vol.46, no.5 (1997).
20
Kevin P. Scanlan, The International Law Commission’s First Ten Draft Articles On The Law Of The NonNavigational Uses Of International Watercourses: Do They Adequately Address All The Major Issues Of Water
Usage In The Middle East? FORDHAM INT'L L.J., Vol.19, 2180 (1996).
21

Island of Palmas (Netherlands vs.USA), P.C.A., U.N vol. II, (1928) at 829-871.
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Sovereignty rights are acknowledged on the basis that every nation has the right to utilize the
waters within its territory to the extent that a state takes into consideration the rights of other
state riparian.22
2. Moderated Sovereignty:
The equitable use considers a remarkable innovation that enables states to have sovereign rights
over their water resources without causing harm to other neighboring states.23 The equitable use
postulates that an international basin is a coherent legal unit. In the Case regarding Oder River,
the Permanent Court of International Justice concluded that the community of interests becomes
the origin of legal right among States.
There was a dispute between Poland and several other States of Europe concerning the question
of whether the jurisdiction of the International Commission of the river Oder extended to the
tributaries of the Oder River located in Polish territory. So, The Court based its judgment upon a
community of interest theory of riparian States by asserting “When consideration is given to the
manner in which States have regarded the concrete situations arising out of the fact that a single
waterway traverses or separates the territory of more than one state … it is at once seen that a
solution… has been sought not in the idea of a right passage …but in that of a community of
interest in a navigable river becomes the basis of a common legal right, the essential features of
which are perfect equality of all riparian States in the use of the whole course of the river and
the exclusion of any preferential privileges of any riparian State in relation to others.”24
However, the application of equitable distribution seems to be vague. The absence of
mechanisms for equitable use principle gives potential incentives to state riparian to impose their
own interest in the absence of specific requirements. Basically, the classical doctrines of
sovereignty are the source of the complex issues associated with modern resource allocation
principles. More specifically, the correlation between state sovereignty and the rule of
international water principles, mainly the responsibility of not causing harm to other riparian
22

Aaron Schwabach, Diverting the Danube: The Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Dispute and International Freshwater Law

BERKELEY J. INT'L L., Vol.14, no. 2 (1996).
23
Stephen C. McCaffrey, 2nd report on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, Y.B. Int’l
L. Comm’n , U.N.Doc.A/CN.4/399, vol. II, (1),1986.
24
CASE RELATING TO THE TERRITORIAL, JURISDLCTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION
OF THE RIVER ODER, Judgment No. 16, 1929, PCIJ, Ser. A, No. 23, p. 27(1929).
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states. On the other hand, many states are involved in several watercourse treaties that do not
provide coherent responsibilities. Therefore, they make a positive application more difficult.
Primarily, the concept of International River is a cornerstone for any water agreement. The
concept has various implications in respect to international water conventions. Accordingly to
start this discussion of the legal principles of watercourses, I clarify the development of
conceptual framework of international rivers.
C. The concept of International Rivers:
International Rivers are the waterways that separate two or more states serving as a boundary or
they cross successively two or more states.25 For international rivers flowing through more than
two states, a state may be in the position of upper stream and lower stream. Different terms are
used, such as multinational rivers, and trans-boundary Rivers. The differences of concepts do not
mean different factual situations but differences of opinion as to the legal principles applicable to
these rivers.26 Traditionally, trans-boundary rivers have been considered in light of the theory of
territorial sovereignty. The segment of the international river flowing within the borders of a
state was regarded as part of the state's territory.27
In an attempt to give legal recognition to physical realities to the management of trans-boundary
Rivers, codifiers of international law have struggled to adopt a workable definition of
International Rivers based upon hydrological concept.
The development of a workable definition has changed over time because State practice is
guided by considerations of territorial sovereignty. Originally, Helsinki rules introduced the
principle that international basins must be regulated as a whole physical unit to assure the
maximum usage of trans-boundary Rivers.28 This principle explicitly includes all tributaries,
including tributary groundwater, within the concept of drainage basin.29 The basin concept
extends beyond the primary definition of international watercourse itself. There is a community
25

Nitza Libai, Development of International River Basins: Regulation of Riparian Competition, IND. L.J., Vol. 45,
Iss.1, 21-43(1969).
26
See, ATTILA TANZI & MAURIZIO ARCARI, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
WATERCOURSES, 42-45 (Patricia Wouters & Serguei Vinogradov eds., 2001).
27
Richard D. Kearney, 1st report on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, Y.B. INT’L
L. COMM’N, U.N Doc. A/CN.4/295, vol. II, (1), 1976.
28
David Lazerwitz, The Flow of International Water Law: The International Law Commission's Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUDIES, Vol. 1, Iss. 1, Art.12, 247270(1993).
29
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of interests in waters, created by the physical nature of trans-boundary Rivers. This unitary
system of international rivers enables riparian states to manage trans-boundary rivers in the most
beneficial way to achieve equitable and reasonable utilization.30
Later on, the International Law Commission has rejected the drainage basin notion and replaced
it with the concept watercourse. According to Article 2 of the UN Water Convention, the concept
watercourse means "a system of surface and underground waters constituting, by virtue of their
physical relationship, a unitary whole and flowing into a common terminus."31By restricting this
definition from its formerly broad definition to focus on international rivers and groundwater
which is tributary to those rivers, the International Law Commission appears to be
accommodating with the reality of State practice over a more holistic resource management
approach.32 The scope of the concepts drainage basin system and international watercourses shall
be addressed here below.
1. International Drainage Basin:
The Congress of Vienna in 1815 stated that the international river system must be conceived as
indivisible unit. This approach was reconfirmed by US President Theodore Roosevelt in 1908. It
was stated that each river system from its origination in the forest to its mouth on the coast must
be treated as a singular unit. Later, this idea was reiterated in a more modern version by Smith
asserting the unified unit of the international basin state without any consideration to the political
boundaries. According to Smith in his classic book “The Economic Uses of International Rivers”
the international river system, according to its physical nature, is seen as an inseparable unit of
natural resource regardless of the political frontier that needs more development to increase the
benefit of human communities.33
The main course of an international river is not only the principal concern due to the fact they are
always a component element of the same hydrologic cycle. Any modification in one part of a
basin, quantitatively or qualitatively, taken by a state, will affect the right of other states sharing
the same river. This approach constituted the foundation of the legal principles applicable to the
evolution of international water law.
30
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The term international drainage basin was introduced by the New York Conference of the
International Law Association in September 1958.34 The conference selected the concept
drainage basin to define “an area within the territories of two or more states in which all the
streams of flowing surface water, both natural and artificial, drain a common watershed
terminating in a common outlet or common outlets either to the sea or to a lake or to some inland
place from which there is no apparent outlet to a sea.”35The International Law Association
expanded the definition previously adopted to include underground waters in 1966. The term
chosen by the Helsinki conference was international drainage basin, Article 2 of the Helsinki
rules stated that “An international drainage basin is a geographical area extending over two or
more states determined by the watershed limits of the system of waters including surface and
underground waters flowing into a common terminus”.36
Helsinki rules initially dealt with the question of whether equitable utilization applied to
groundwater via a more cautious approach. The Helsinki rules concluded groundwater that forms
part of an international basin, includes anybody of groundwater that is intersected by an
international boundary. This applies even though the groundwater is not intersected to an
internationally shared surface water source.
From a scientific point of view, "the river basin, bounded by its drainage divide and subject to
surface and sub-surface drainage under gravity to the ocean or to interior lakes, forms the logical
areal unit for hydrological studies”.37In defining drainage basin may have been unfortunate since,
it implies that not only water but also land areas might fall within the scope of the rules.38 This
has caused some states to reject the entire concept of the drainage basin as the proper basis for a
set of rules on international watercourses.39

34

INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION BERLIN CONFERENCE, BERLIN CONFERENCE WATER
RESOURCES LAW 4th report, 3-4 (2004).
35
Stephen Schwebel, 3rd report on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses, U.N Doc.
A/CN.4/348 and Corr.1, Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N vol. II (1), 1982.
36
The Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of International Rivers, Art.2, International Law association (1966).
37
Stephen Mccaffrey, An Assessment of the Work of the International Law Commission, NAT. RESOURCES J.,vol. 36,
298-318,(1996).
38
Stephen Mccaffrey, International Organizations and the Holistic Approach to Water Problems, NAT. RESOURCES J.
Vol. 31,140-164 (1991).
39

Id. at 144

13

2. International Watercourses:
During drafting of the UN watercourses Convention, the International Law Commission gathered
state opinion on whether the notion of an international drainage basin should be the appropriate
basis for their study.40 Some states objected to the concept, arguing that it could result in
regulation not only of the use of the water but also of the land territory.41 Ultimately, the
international watercourse notion was selected by the International Law Commission and
supported by states. The term watercourse as expressed in article 2 in The UN watercourses
convention defines the type of waters to which the convention applies. Article 2(1) states
“Watercourse means a system of surface waters and ground waters constituting by virtue of their
physical relationship a unitary whole and normally flowing into a common
terminus.”42According to Article 2, the Convention applies to watercourse systems that cross
international boundaries, including major watercourses, their tributaries, and connected lakes and
aquifers, even when these components are entirely located within a single state.43 “To the extent
that parts of the waters in one State are not affected by or do not affect uses of waters in another
State, they shall not be treated as being included in the international watercourse system”.44Thus,
“to the extent that the uses of the waters of the system have an effect on one another, to that
extent the system is international, but only to that extent; accordingly, there is not an absolute,
but a relative, international character of the watercourse.”45
The concept of an international watercourse system comes very close to that of an international
drainage basin concept. The most obvious difference is what is described as the "relative
international character" of an international watercourse.46 From a hydrographic approach, a
watercourse is international if elements of the system are situated in more than one State.
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D. The Scheme of International Water Law:
The basis of International Water law was formed by the Helsinki Rules of 1966, which were
formulated by the International Law Association. It was the first attempt to codify the customs of
international boundary rivers. They became widely regarded as the principal norms for the use of
international rivers.47 Following the path of the International Law Association, the International
Law Commission adopted the Draft Articles on the Law of Non Navigational Uses of Shared
Rivers.48The Convention was adopted by the UNGA.
1. Helsinki rules:
There are substantive rules that have evolved from state practices regarding the use of
international watercourses among states. The International Law Association, an international
nongovernmental organization founded in 1873 with the objective to develop and restate
international law, formulated the equitable utilization principle to express the principle of limited
sovereignty as applied to a shared watercourse49.
Article 4 of chapter two in Helsinki rules states that “Each Basin State is entitled, within its
territory, to a reasonable and equitable share in the beneficial uses of the waters of an
international drainage basin”.50 According to article 5(2), what is a reasonable share is to be
determined in the light of several criteria, such as the geography and the hydrology of the basin;
the climate affecting the basin; the economic and social needs of each basin State; the population
dependent on the waters of the basin; comparative costs of alternative means of satisfying the
economic and social needs of each basin State, the availability of other resources and the
entitlement uses.51 The no harm rule appears in article 5(2), where it is one among a series of
criteria that may be used to determine whether utilization is equitable and reasonable.52
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According to the no harm factor, States shall not cause substantial harm to the quantity or quality
of the shared watercourse beyond the limits of the state’s jurisdiction.53
2. United Nations (UN) Convention on the Non-Navigational Uses of International
Watercourses:
The Helsinki rules were further developed in the 1997 United Nations Convention on the Non
navigational Uses of Watercourses. The International Law Association revised its water laws at
the Berlin Conference in 2004.54 Current international water laws consist of terms advocating
equitable and reasonable water utilization, obligation not to cause harm to other riparian states
and environmental sustainability. It took several years for the United Nations Convention on the
Non navigational Uses of Watercourses to enter into force on 17 August 2014.55The convention
has been ratified by thirty five nations.56
Central principles to the UN watercourses convention are the equitable use and the no harm rule.
The principle of equitable use is the main doctrine guiding water sharing in international water
law. As stated in Art.5 (1) of the UN Convention, the principle determines that “watercourse
shall in their respective territories utilize an international watercourse in an equitable and
reasonable manner. In particular, an international watercourse shall be used and developed by
watercourse states with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization thereof and
benefits there from, taking into account the interests of the watercourse states concerned,
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse”.57 In this context, equitable share does
not mean equal division of the waters. Rather, it means that all relevant factors such as
population, geography, pre existing uses, or the availability of alternative resources have to be
considered in each individual case when allocating water rights.58

53

Joseph W Dellapenna, The Customary International Law of transboundary fresh waters, INT’. J. GLOBAL
no.3/4, 264-289(2001).
54
Salman, supra note 47.
55
The U.N Convention of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses Convention, A/51/869, 11 (1997).
Under international law: 17 August 2014, in accordance with article 36(1). The present convention shall enter into
force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, acceptance,
approval, or accession with the Secretary General of the United Nations.
56
The International Law commission home page available at
https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-12&chapter=27&lang=en
ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, Vol.1,

57

The U.N Watercourses Convention ,Article 5 , A/51/869, 11 (1997).
Esther Wildberg, The 1997 International Watercourses Convention – Background and Negotiations (Working
Paper On Management in Environmental Planning 2002) available at www.landschaftsoekonomie.tuberlin.de/fileadmin/a0731/uploads/publikationen/workingpapers/wp00402.pdf
58

16

Since the principle of equitable use is flexible, the concept demands balancing the competing
interests of riparian states; taking into account all relevant factors and circumstances. Most uses
are not static since different scenarios with different situations can trigger a need to reassess
relevant factor in each case.
The second principal pillar of the UN water convention is the obligation not to cause significant
harm to other neighboring states. Article 7(1) of the UN Watercourses Convention requires that
states “in utilizing an international watercourse in their territories, take all appropriate measures
to prevent the causing of significant harm to other watercourse States”.59 The principle that
States have an obligation to cooperate in the interests of avoiding harm to another State was
clearly articulated in the Lake Lanoux Arbitration “States are today perfectly conscious of the
importance of the conflicting interests brought into play by the industrial use of international
rivers, and of the necessity…to reconcile them by mutual concessions. The only way to arrive at
such compromises of interests is to conclude agreements on an increasingly comprehensive
basis. . . . There would thus appear to be an obligation to accept in good faith all
communications and contracts which could, by a broad comparison of interests and by
reciprocal good will, provide States with the best conditions for concluding agreements ...”60
In Trail smelter case, the tribunal endorsed the approach of the United States supreme court by
saying “Under the principles of international law, as well as the law of the united States, no state
has the right to use or permit the use of Its territory in such a manner as to cause injury by fumes
to the territory of another or when the case is of serious consequence and the injury is
established by clear and convincing evidence”. The affected state must prove actual damage and
its causation.61Article 7(2) declares an obligation for the state causing harm to consult with the
injured state, but qualifies even that limited obligation by requiring consultation only over
whether the harmful use is significant.62 Also, whether the harm might be reduced or prevented
by alterations to the way water is used.
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For harm to be qualified as significant it must not be trivial in nature but it need not rise to the
level of being substantial; this is to be determined on a case by case basis.63
The scope of harm is determined by “significant” to exclude any trivial injury that States are
expected to tolerate.64
The qualifications of the environmental and economic impacts are essential because it
determines whether the results of a specific use are significant and therefore prohibited.65 The
implementation of the no harm rule is a complex assessment because it is difficult to gather
accurate data about environmental and economic impacts.
The process of evidence gathering is a very expensive work. The process requires the
contribution of reputable experts in diverse spheres such as hydrological, economic, and
technical domains. These procedures are highly subjective that aggravates water disputes rather
than rebuild state cooperation. The reference to the question of compensation at the end of the
article becomes highly vague, arguably limiting the obligation to pay compensation to situations
where the harmful use is neither equitable nor reasonable.66
The general language leads to multiple interpretations. For instance, Ethiopia called for equitable
use as it needs to develop socio economic aspect and their sovereign rights over water. While
Egypt argues for the no harm rule by asserting its acquired rights based on the previous
agreements. Several interpretation leads to a justification by both states. There is not an
enforcement mechanism. The International court of Justice hears cases only with the consent of
parties. Consequently, riparian states become splashed into several interpretations all move in the
direction of an endless argument. It is inaccurate to argue that international law is effectively
supported by solutions on controversies of all sorts.
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The no harm rule is often called by downstream states to protect their existing uses. In contrast,
the equitable use doctrine is generally favored by upstream states because it most effectively
protects their right of development. When negative externalities occurred, injury to the
downstream states considers only one factor for the determination of equitable utilization. “The
principle of equitable utilization and the no harm rule are intended to be complementary on the
basis that the no harm rule requires avoidance of harm in a way that is reasonable.”67 However,
the vagueness of the adjectives describing the terms for implementation equitable use is a
problematic issue when it comes to prioritizing the equitable utilization principle over the no
harm rule.
The relationship between the principle of equitable use and the no harm rule within the text of
the Convention is dictated by Article 7(2) which stipulates that any State causing harm to another
must, “take all appropriate measures, having due regard to the provisions of Article 5 and
Article 6 to eliminate or mitigate such harm.”68 Based on these provisions of the UN
Watercourses Convention, a State must always give due regard to the principle of equitable and
reasonable utilization whenever significant injury occurs.69 However, there is not a mutual
obligation of due regard to the principle of no significant harm when states are determining if a
use or uses are equitable and reasonable.70 This essential distinction is what has led many legal
scholars to conclude that the duty not to cause significant harm is thus a secondary obligation to
the primary principle of equitable and reasonable utilization.71
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The framework of the UN watercourses convention revolves around the concept of mutual
limitation of sovereign rights. The unresolved correlation between the two core principles of
equitable use and no significant harm has allowed states to maintain irreconcilable positions.
According to the rule of equitable utilization, States riparian are entitled to use trans-boundary
Rivers in an equitable manner. What is equitable must be determined in each case and depends
upon various criteria. These criteria vary from the economic, social, to geographic and existing
uses or availability of alternative resources. The UN watercourses convention principles
effectively 'neutralize the correlation between these two main principles without resolving the
priority issue. The watercourses convention deprives each side of convincing legal arguments for
the priority of their claims. Riparian states are forced to re-examine their stances and to
communicate in order to find fair solutions to their disagreements. Through the open-ended
equitable utilization principle, the convention provides little in the way of substantive guidance
for the necessary balancing processes.
E. Time for a review of the UN watercourses convention:
In practical terms, the uncertainties embodied in the articles 5 and 7 of the United Nations 1997
Convention leaves loopholes for the political domain and bargaining between the parties the
decisive role to determine the results of any dispute that may arise. The paradox of legal
principles in the UN water convention institutionalizes the dispute among the upstream and
downstream riparian states.
The equitable use principle implies a balancing of interests between riparian states. This entails
an examination of all relevant conditions pertaining to a particular situation. Riparian states
should agree on certain factors on which the can build their assessment and consult with other
states. Such criteria include economic, social, geographical, and existing uses. It should be noted
that these criteria are not fixed, but subject to change and alteration. As consequence, a
determination of equitable use must be frequently reassessed and reviewed, sine changing
conditions require modifications.
The no harm principle is linked to multiple mitigating criteria to be considered. Firstly, the UN
convention requires the injury should be sufficiently significant. The determinant of what is
significant may be different in each situation. Secondly, the required standard of action is one of
due diligence that means it does not entail responsibility for the mere occurrence of a result.
States shall take into account all measures not to cause significant harm that mostly to be
20

fulfilled in a domestic level, and generally involves the adoption of administrative levels as well
as their enforcement.
The upstream states may be deprived of its right to develop such activity by the no harm rule.
The obligation to prevent harm does not permit downstream states to completely restrict the
economic development of upstream states.
There are two interests to reconcile; each of them involves an intervention in the exercise of
absolute sovereignty of states. First, the developmental goal of a state which entails embarking
on huge projects of national significance and impacts, the second and equally important interest
is the prevention of any damage caused to other states.
The UN watercourses convention is concerned with enabling states to demonstrate an end result
of equitable use of international rivers. As a result the convention does not present directly the
cause of conduct which may prevent the reasonable use from being realized.72 The UN
convention pays attention to the outcomes of equitable water sharing. Consequently, the
substantive principles are insufficiently developed to represent issues arising from the use of
invisible ideological power by one state to attain control over water resources shared with other
states. By presenting these issues, the framework of the UN convention should determine what
defines the invisible use of power leading to inequitable water sharing.
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III. The Scope of the Constructivist approach:
The ability of competition over water resources to trigger major inter-state disputes has been a
pivotal topic in international relations. The strategic importance of water resources has unleashed
a field of hydro politics. Water tensions between states play a principal role in national politics.
In regions where there is a problem of water scarcity, competition over shared water resources
could lead to war.73At the same time, it is also undeniable that there are many instances of
cooperation among states sharing water resources despite the existence of deep-rooted political
tensions. Among the significant examples is the Indus Waters Treaty signed between India and
Pakistan. In this chapter, I employ a constructivist approach to the study of water disputes. I
emphasize that water disputes are embedded in wider historical and political contexts. I develop
the intuition that the way competition between states over water resources evolves is not only
determined by material forces, but also by interactions among the relevant actors.
A. Competition and cooperation along shared rivers:
Competition over water resources could increasingly become a source of tension among states.
The stakes in disputes over the distribution of trans-boundary water resources are high. At the
same time, history has often shown that the need for freshwater can drive states toward
cooperation. The emerging questions of competition and cooperation on trans- boundary Rivers
require seeking the dynamics of behavioral change. As a consequence, the correlation between
international relations and international law become important to understand how changes from
competition to cooperation could be occurred among riparian states. International relations
theories provided underlying theoretical framework.
In the theoretical debate concerning the competitive and cooperative nature of international
rivers, two principal approaches can be identified: the realist and liberalist approaches.
According to realism approach, states always act in accordance with their national interest.74
Realists believe that nations are driven b self- interest and struggle for power to improve its
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military security and economic welfare in competition with other countries.75 Accordingly,
realism approach builds its assumption on the reality that water scarcity leads to a conflictive
nature. Regarding trans- boundary water issues, states cannot practice unilateral decisions and
absolute sovereignty on international rivers. Therefore, there is a high possibility of competition
between states. Water war notion is based on the assumption that water scarcity creates a zero
sum game that inspires self interest. A gain for one country is definitely a loss for others and thus
engages in a constant struggle for survival through the fight for water.76
From realist perspective, it appears logic to expect that two enemies would not wish to cooperate
upon shared water, each preferring to maintain full control over water resources. In a zero-sum
game there is no point in communication or cooperation between the actors because their
interests are totally opposed.77
I agree with Wendt that in the logic of realism, all states become the same machines that merely
follow the rule, and there is no way to assume or explain the structural change happening in the
real world. For realists, interests of states are given; states know who they are and what they
want before they begin to interact with other states. Hence, in realism, the given anarchic
international structure in reality, which refers to the absence of the central government
conducting states in order, forces states to pursue self-help and egoistic behavior permanently.
Realism put material forces including power and interest as the independent variable for a
structural change.
Liberalism, on the other hand, attempts to find ways of collective interests among states in order
to achieve cooperation including working through international institutions.78 It focuses on how
institutions affect the behavior of states by spreading values.79 Institutions in this sense mean set
of rules which govern state behavior in particular policy areas. Consequently, Institutions
encourage cooperative behavior, and monitoring the adhering to rules. Therefore, it seems that
while realism starts from the inevitability of competition and dispute, liberalism starts from the
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inevitability of cooperation. The central concepts of these theories are usually fixed and stable.
Neither realism nor liberalism approaches can apparently explain the changes in the competitive
and cooperative nature of trans- boundary water issues. I share the constructivist approach by
looking at the value of critical approaches as a systemic level offering to understand international
relations. I treat constructivist approach as broadly understood critical theories.
B. The Framework of constructivist approach:
Central to the constructivist approach is the question of how we come to understand what we
know.80 Constructivist postulates that knowledge is constructed by states simultaneously, and
denies the existence of a fixed reality.81 For example, a state who conceives a thing is situated in
certain types of political, historical, economic, and social contexts. Therefore, constructivist
approach believes that international relations are never objective; international relations are
created in line with multiple interests. Constructivist rejects the materialist approach and the
rational choice in international relations.82 Materialist refers to theory that states respond
to material needs, and power. Whereas rationalism is the theory that states pursue individual
advantage by evaluating costs and benefits. In contrast, constructivist emphasizes
the social construction of what states are and what they want. Therefore, the international system
is also in process, which can change by change of states. States think and behave in politics
domain is determined by their own perception of the world around them, and the identities they
hold about themselves and others.83 States rely on their experiences in those contexts when they
are cognized with something. In this sense, knowledge is a thing continuously being constructed
by state’s own cognition that is created through those contexts.84 In this way, knowledge is not
fixed that becomes a historical tool which is useful for states to understand the world in their
own understanding.
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Constructivist encompasses a multiple range of approaches and assumptions; I formulated my
key premise on Alexander Wendt and his Social Theory of International Politics. However, I
avoid one of the apparent shortcomings of Wendt approach, which takes states as given. Wendt
excludes the constructed nature of states that contradicts the principal goal of constructivist. My
focus research deals with state relations as the main actors of trans- boundary rivers, and
excludes the constructed nature of states as well.
Wendt offers one of the most comprehensive looks at constructivist. Wendt believes the behavior
of state on international platform depends upon an endless process of interactions and
communications between states.85 In this process of interaction, the interests of states are created.
According to Wendt, actions of states in the international sphere are the only main concern.86
The examination of the international system cannot comprehend every pattern in domestic
society, accordingly, the domestic and the international spheres should be separated
methodologically.87 Wendt excludes domestic processes to focus on the effect of interaction
between states. In the case of trans-boundary Rivers, domestic and international identities have
an impact on the changes of identities and interests. However, states do not form a conception of
themselves only through interaction. Domestic conditions of a state can change the state’s
identity and interests independently of such interaction. Therefore, I implement a holistic view
that integrates the domestic identity of states with the international sphere.
Wendt emphasizes the social construction of structures, the politics and interest forming role of
identity, and the mutually constructed nature of agents and structures. By “agents” I mean
practices of states that produce state identities, and by “structures” I mean the collective
understanding and institutional norms that makeup the context of state action. Structures are not
immutable but can be recast through changes of behavioral states. Consequently, the two pillars
of agents and structures should be treated “simultaneously”.
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Wendt points out that there can be two types of questions on which it focuses in order to explain
a social phenomenon.88 The first question is how an action is possible. The second question is
why a specific action happened. For example, to explain why a state went to cooperation rather
than conflict, one must know how a state’s choice was possible in the first place. State practices
and their associated legal norms cannot be treated as given. Structural explanation reveals the
rules of existence by looking at historical tendency. In essence, history teases out factors that
lead to the dynamic nature of behavioral states.
Wendt holds that the structures of interaction are determined by shared ideas rather than material
forces.89 He states that the importance of material conditions depends on interests, and interests
are constructed on the basis of idea. Specifically, as soon as actors start interacting with each
other, beliefs immediately become collective ideas.90 These beliefs help actors define the
situation and constitute their interests.
Materials cannot have value independent from shared ideas. In the case of trans-boundary
Rivers, for example, “downstream states of the Nile basin are less utilizing to the river than
upstream states because of the shared understandings that underpin them.” Here, the identity
formed by a historical process is the deep underlying factors of the competitive nature derived
from materials, not materials themselves. Constructivist approach suggests that material forces,
such as power, must be understood through the social concepts that define their meaning for
human life.91
State practices might sometimes be relatively stable, but they are never constant. As practices
changes over time, shared understandings that looked static may change as well.92For example,
sovereignty is a central organizing force in international relations that rests on the shared ideas of
people and the practices people engage in. sovereignty is a social institution in the sense that a
state can be sovereign only when it is seen by people and other states as a corporate actor with
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rights and obligations over territory and citizens. The practice of sovereignty on trans-boundary
Rivers has transformed from absolute sovereignty to regulated sovereignty over time.
Identities and interests of states are constructed by shared ideas among states.93The question
arose in this context, what is meant by the social construction of identity, or that identities are
constructed by shared ideas? Collective understandings are more than just the beliefs of
individuals; it determines practices of states. According to constructivist, these relations generate
from a distribution of ideas as states often speak of their interests.
C. The formation of identities and interests in constructivist approach:
Identities in constructivist analysis play a very significant role because they provide the basis for
state interests. Identities are prescriptive representations of state actors themselves and of their
relationships to each other. In general, State identity is “how a state identifies itself and others”.94
In the background, the identities perform two vital functions. Firstly it expresses to the self and
others who the self is. Secondly it expresses to the self who others are.
The first function, having a certain identity, determines the set of actions that a state would prefer
to take in various circumstances and when different actors are involved. That is why a state's
identity generates its interests and subsequent behavior towards fellow members and situations
related to the international system. The second function implies that a state perceives others
according to the identities it attributes to them, while simultaneously reproducing its own identity
through social interaction and practice. States “do not have a “written set” of interests that they
carry around independent of social context; instead, they define their interests in accordance to
an existing situation.95
Constructivists argue that state identities generate national interests that enable and constrain
state strategies. Thus, constructivist suggests that beliefs, norms, and practices are manifested by
state identity.96As Wendt argues “interests presuppose identities because an actor cannot know
what it wants until it knows who it is, and since identities have varying degrees of cultural
content so will interests”.97 Consequently, how do they acquire those identities? How would
they define ‘self’ and ‘other’? In order to explain identity construction, Wendt differentiates
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between distinctive concepts of state identity, which are corporate identity and social identity.98
Firstly, “Corporate identity” refers to the distinguishing features of a state and self-organizing
qualities that form the basis for its self-respect and pride. This “corporate identity” is regarded as
being existent prior to the interaction with other actors. Secondly; social identities refer to
categories of states. Examples of categories include major power, superpower, democracy,
federation, the United Nations, the European Union. While actors have one corporate identity,
they usually have several social identities. Social identities enable actors to determine ‘who they
are’ in a context of relation to others. For example, “one cannot be an ‘anticommunist’ if there
are no communists around, nor a ‘balancer’ if there is no one to balance”.99
Wendt treats social identity only as totally constructed and subject of change.100I believe that this
idea contradicts the core argument of constructivist, that is, the identities of states are not given,
but are established or transformed through interactions. I contend that all state identities are
entitled to change. This is because the factors in the normative framework of constructivist are
not stable but inherently variable. In this thesis, I analyze how the changes in state identities,
regardless of their classifications, influence the changes of cooperative or competitive behavior
of states regarding trans-boundary Rivers.
Constructivists assume that state interests are influenced by the identities and strategies in
several ways.101 Firstly, specific beliefs embodied in the identities of actors determine which
action takes place to fulfill these interests. This in turn helps shape state preferences regarding
particular actions.102 Secondly, identities consolidate specific principles and practices that
determine which strategies are legitimate and acceptable in a given situation.103 This may have
constraints or incentives, in particular, foreign policy options that differ based upon various
situations.
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While identities determine what states are, interests denote what states desire. The social
construction of interests includes all the ways that states preferences might be influenced by their
interactions with others such as political, economic, and social environments.
This includes the implication of social norms on behavioral state, including the desire to create
norms that legitimize state’s behavior.104Interests may differ from state to state in accordance
with their identities, but their underlying needs are common to all states.
The shared interests include the preservation of state territorial property. In the same vein,
without the freedom to exercise control over their natural resources, states will not be able to
address their internal needs. In addition, the remarkable national interest is economic wellbeing that is achieved by the effective “maintenance of the mode of production in a society and,
by extension, the state’s resource base.105
Shared identities among states not only show the positive identification of state actors with the
role of cooperation but also refer to the passive identification with the role of hostility.106 These
in turn created partly on the basis of relationships with other state actors. Taking the perspective
of the other is a kind of tolerance to the difference between the self and the other. It is a process
of identity socialization of the self and its result is the emergence of international collective
identity.107 The relationship between states based on shared identities may be competitive or
cooperative. By changing actors’ identities, change of socially constructed realties is possible.
As Wendt puts it, “identities may be hard to change, but they are not carved in stone”.108
D. the impact of international principles in the constructivist paradigm:
The relationship between strategic behavior and international norms raises more general
questions about the effect of norms in the legal context. Constructivist approach informs us that
norms are embedded in the international system as principles and rules by which actors are
identified. The embedded principles allow states to understand what acceptable behavior is and
transform this behavior into the system. The states redefine acceptable practices in the
international system. In this manner, the behavioral change of states may be transformed.
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For example, Turkey used the Euphrates water resources as a trump card in solving the Kurdish
issue in the region. At the same time, Turkey seeks European Union membership; accordingly,
Turkey introduced new language toward cooperation in water sharing. The argument that water
is an absolute sovereignty definitely out of place for a society approached to democratic norms
of behavior.
In addition, international organizations were instrumental promoting international principles.
They can socialize states to accept new norms values and perceptions of interest. For example,
The World Bank plays a pivotal role in solving trans-boundary water disputes. Not only
international organizations are able to affect state’s national interest, but also integrate new
interests into the state. States can define their situation and decide what will they do based upon
the situation by referring to the international norms. International norms promoted by
international organizations can decisively influence national guidelines by pushing states to
adopt these norms in their policies.
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IV. Case Studies of trans-boundary Rivers: Division or water sharing in the Euphrates
and Indus rivers:
The chapter draws on an empirical study of how constructivist approach contributes to the
understanding of the dynamics of state identities and interests regarding trans-boundary rivers.
For the sake of the discussion, I selected two case studies that demonstrate changes of state
relations between competition and cooperation regarding trans-boundary rivers. The Indus River
and the Euphrates basin serve as two case studies that show how identities and interests of states
determine the scope of state behaviour regarding trans-boundary rivers.
In the Euphrates case, I represent various interests that have interacted to reshape the identities of
state actors in a historical context between 1920s till2000s. These variables are represented in
geographic, economic, and political domains. In the first place, the analysis of a historical period
assists to understand how trans-boundary rivers have been represented over time and space.
From the economic context, water resources are essential to meet the basic need of industry, and
agriculture. On the other hand, geographical and political aspects have an important impact in
assessing the potential value of trans-boundary flows.
Physical geography formulates a degree of similarity or difference of interests. Along the same
lines, I explore how state relations between India and Pakistan changed over time into a
cooperative behavior. I focused on the historical period between 1920s till 1960s. Although the
Indus River was considered one of the most difficult water disputes in the nineteenth century, the
dispute was ended up by a successful agreement. I formulate my core premise on the basis of
constructivist approach. Consequently, I argue that relations among riparian states are
intertwined with the inter-subjective process related to the concepts of state identities and
interests.
A. Why the Euphrates and Indus rivers:
The Euphrates and Indus basins are primarily common in the literature of trans-boundary rivers
and they represent the hegemony of the upstream riparian states upon the waters. However, they
are theorized quite differently. The Indus River is broadly considered to have been one of the
most successful resolved cases in the nineteenth century, while the case of the Euphrates basin
may be perceived as ongoing negotiations of water sharing. Parties of the case studies have
reached agreements at differing degrees. Despite water scarcity is considered the main drive
force for competing or cooperating upon natural resources, various variables interact to
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determine the degree of cooperation or competition. Without the understanding of political
relations, economic context, social pattern, and geographical variables, it is not possible to
discuss the role of the UN Water Convention. Still, the UN convention is the umbrella that
governs all the underling variables.
In the Euphrates case, the development of trans-boundary water relations has witnessed several
different stages. Since 1960, this period has witnessed the advent of competitive trans-boundary
water politics shaped by the construction of uncoordinated water projects, particularly the
upstream riparian of Turkey that controlled a large quantity of the basin. This case presents the
hegemony of the upstream riparian upon water resources. Turkey has developed strategic
schemes in water resources utilization in the Euphrates basin since the 1960.
The Southern Anatolia Project has impacted negatively water resources throughout the basin.
The third stage was the most complex, given the link between trans-boundary water issues and
instability of political relations. In the early 1997, water relations have shifted from conflictive to
a degree of cooperative negotiations. The underlying interests of behavioral change of Turkey
can be related to bilateral and regional incentives. On the other hand, the Indus River is a unique
water dispute where quantity was never addressed among states; rather the geographic nature in
the basin was taken into consideration for division of the waters. Consequently, the principal
variable in the Indus case is the economic variable coupled with governance and legal domains.
These factors can be used to describe the successful case of the Indus agreement.
B. Water relations and Issues of scarcity:
The implication of water scarcity upon human relation supposes that the limited resource of fresh
water emerges tremendous stress upon states. Water scarcity is more than a matter of increased
population, and climate change. I argue that the politics of inequitable distribution of water is
more crucial than the absolute geographical scarcity of water resources. Water scarcity can
emerge from excessive water development projects such as hydropower projects and canals.
Water scarcity is influenced by a variety of factors, including, climate, economic activities,
population growth, perceptions and traditions, and the unbalanced allocation. Arun Elhance
writes that the multiple use of trans- boundary water resources, combined with the certainty of
growing water scarcities in several dried and semi arid regions, makes hydro politics among
riparian states that share international rivers one of the most crucial and complex issues that the
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developing states and the international community will have to face and resolve in the future.109It
is believed that increasing scarcity of water intensifies the desire among nations to control water
resources, which often forces them to engage in war.110 However, even authors who expect
dispute concede that a scare resource of water does not frequently result in violence.111 Wolf
points out that “war over water seems neither strategically rational, nor hydrographically
effective, or economically viable".112
Since water is essential to sustain communities; it becomes a security theme for political parties.
A water policy is primarily drafted by ad hoc agreements with general norms involved in
decision making. Since negotiation, conflict and cooperation over water are a dominant part of
the international relations among states, studying the manner in which negotiations come about,
the facilitating variables and the options and strategies that are available is crucial. The Indus
Waters Treaty was appreciated by the international community and considered as a good
example of water conflict management. The immediate result of the treaty was that the Indus
basin became politically and economically viable for India and Pakistan. It has opened new ways
for independent development of the water of the Indus Basin.
C. The case study of Euphrates Tigris Basin:
In the Euphrates basin, states perception does not determine one-sided competition or
cooperation. However, water relations in the Euphrates basin evolved through multiple stages
varying from competition toward a fluctuated degree of cooperation. The main interests which
can explain the fluctuated water relations among states can be summarized in geographical
nature, economic pattern, and political issues. I contend that the competitive and cooperative
nature of trans-boundary rivers is really the result of the issues of state identities and interests.
Therefore, I represent three major historical periods of state relations regarding trans-boundary
rivers.
1. Physical pattern of the Tigris Euphrates river system:
The Tigris Euphrates is a trans- boundary river exists in parts of Iraq, Turkey, Iran, Syria, Saudi
Arabia, and Jordan. Tigris is the eastern member of the two great rivers that define Mesopotamia,
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the other being the Euphrates. The river flows south from the mountains of southeastern Turkey
through Iraq. The Tigris joins the Euphrates near al-Qurnah, a small town in Iraq, to form the
Shatt-al-Arab before emptying into the Persian Gulf. However, Saudi Arabia and Iran are not
major riparian states in this basin. Iran is a riparian state solely to the Tigris, and Jordan and
Saudi Arabia are riparian only to the Euphrates.113Moreover, the Saudi Arabia stretches of the
Euphrates dries in summer, and due to unfavorable geographic and climatic conditions Iran
cannot use the waters of the Tigris for agriculture or hydropower. Therefore, these countries have
generally been ignored in studies of the basin.114
Both rivers originate in Turkey and flow along Syrian territory before intersecting Iraq.Turkey is
located in the upper stream riparian on both rivers. Turkey is a unique state in the Middle East
that can fairly be described to have surplus water.115Approximately ninety percent of the
Euphrates River is emerged in Turkey while the remaining ten percent generates in Syria. Iraqi
territory does not make any contribution to the run off. On the other hand, Turkey contributes
approximately forty percent of the total annual flow of the Tigris River while Iraq contributes by
fifty one percent.116There is not Syrian water drains into the Tigris. The amount of water flow in
the Euphrates Tigris basin can be said to be reasonable for various utilization by the shared
riparian states. However in recent times, the creation of major projects by Turkey has put
excessive pressure on the supply of the basin river.117
The Euphrates basin shows a great variation in flow. In the past, the natural annual flow of the
Euphrates at the Syrian Turkish borders was approximately thirty billion cubic meters. Recently,
it was shown a negative trend, indicating a decrease in mean annual flow to approximately
twenty five billion cubic meters.118
A major concern between the neighboring riparian states is the question of whether Euphrates
and Tigris can be considered as a unified system. Syria and Iraq considers that the Euphrates and
Tigris are two separate rivers. Turkey does not share this approach. Turkey argues that the two
113

Product of the Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, Department of Geosciences, Oregon State
University. Additional information about the TFDD available at
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/research/case_studies/Tigris-Euphrates_New.htm
114
Id.
115
Dellapenna, supra note 66.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Patrick MacQuarrie, Water Security In The Middle East Growing Conflict Over Development In The Euphrates
Tigris Basin , Originally submitted 15 Sep. 2003 Thesis, College, Dublin, Ireland,( Revised: 26 Feb. 2004).

34

rivers connect together at Shatt-al-Arab before emptying into the Persian Gulf. As a
consequence, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers are often described as forming one basin river.119
The conflictive claims are explained by the fact that the riparian states hope to gain the ultimate
profits from their respective claims. The downstream states doubt that if they were to consider
the Tigris and Euphrates River as an integrated system, this in turn would affect their rights to an
adequate share of the river. At the same time, Turkey is trying to protect its water storage
projects in the Euphrates River. The Euphrates River is more suitable for water storage projects
than the Tigris River due to proper geographic conditions.
I share the view that the Tigris-Euphrates River is a single basin system. According to the UN
watercourses convention, a drainage basin is considered an integrated system if two or more
rivers share a common terminus and their waters by virtue of their relationship a unitary whole.
Apparently, the Tigris and Euphrates rivers flow into a common terminus at the shatt-al-Arab,
and both rivers are interconnected. Due to the excessive Turkish dam projects that located in the
Euphrates borders, I focus on the Keban dam and the southern Anatolian projects that affected
negatively the water sharing of downstream states.
I employ the management of the Euphrates River is an extreme model of how state intervention
can impact the geographical nature of international rivers. With the construction of major
hydropower projects in upstream Turkey, the Euphrates flow regime has shifted towards less
pronounced seasonal variation. Not only the riparian states, but also scientists, have disagreed
about the mean annual discharge of both rivers, mainly due to their seasonal fluctuations.
2. The economic ambition in the Euphrates Basin: historical period between 1920s – 1980s:
The breakup of the Ottoman Empire after the World War One created a number of modern
nation states. Iraq was governed as mandate by the United Kingdom until 1932, after
independence; it had to focus on state stability.120 At the same vein, Syria concentrated on
building its nation state and stabilization, after it had gained independence from France in 1932.
During that period of identity modification, Turkey focused on the development of the Eastern
Anatolia after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.
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On the whole, the main derived interest was domestic evolution in the Mesopotamia region. The
Euphrates riparian states focused on building their newly nations and identities rather than the
development of foreign water policies. Primarily, water has not been one of the dimensions of
state building and, therefore, water tensions were not witnessed among riparian states in the
initial periods of state building within the Euphrates basin. The Euphrates water resources was
adequate to satisfy the needs of the three riparian of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq due to the less
developed hydropower projects and irrigated system of the states.
Overall, water tensions were not experienced between riparian states in the initial periods of state
building in the basin. However, the developmental stage has witnessed a turning point towards a
competitive manner by initiating a large number of uncoordinated water projects inside the
Euphrates Basin. According to Wolf, the red line for water disputes among states are not water
shortage but rather unilateral attempts to create an international river, usually by a regional
power.121
Notably, the period between1960s and early 1980s were marked by major water storage
developments.122 Turkey has put forward ambitious plans to utilize the water of the Euphrates
basin for energy and irrigation uses by building enormous water storage facilities. As this
development activity and planning took place in the 1960s and early 1980s, it soon became
evident that there was not going to be enough water available in the basin to satisfy the planned
needs of the three major states located in the basin.
Without doubt, Turkey is in the strongest position with regard to its potential control of a large
part of the water resources of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. It can develop its water management
schemes, and the two downstream countries of Syria and Iraq will have to suffer the
consequences of lower flow conditions. The numerous amounts of dams would seriously reduce
downstream water resources, which would affect seriously their economic activities.
Specifically, the agricultural policies of Syria and Iraq mainly depend on the Euphrates River.123
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Particularly, agriculture has always been a predominant variable in the Syrian economy, relying
significantly on irrigation supplied from the Euphrates River. Syria increasingly depends on the
waters of the Euphrates and from Tabqa dam. Approximately ninety percent of Euphrates water
withdrawn in Syria goes to agriculture.124 The main cash crops are water demanding such as
wheat. Syrian utilization of the Euphrates River has shifted over time drastically, and couple of
tributaries lost their flow into Syria.
In the same vein, agriculture has been the primary economic activity of Iraq. Agricultural
products contributed t to forty two percent between 1970 to1980 of Iraq’s Growth domestic.125
Recently, it has become a net importer of agricultural goods, importing up to eighty percent in
the late 1990.126 The shift was due to reduction of government spending on agriculture, and loss
of soil productivity in poorly drained areas to the downstream rapid. Both Syria and Iraq demand
considerable amounts of water for their less fertile lands in the Euphrates river basin where there
exists a water scarcity problem.
The Keban dam was the first of several large-scale dams to be built on the Euphrates River by
Turkey. Since Turkey made the decision to establish the dam in the Euphrates basin, the relations
between riparian states shifted toward conflictive nature. The United States Agency for
International Development was the financing institution of the Keban Dam.127
In order to provide Syria and Iraq with information concerning the Keban Dam, copies of the
feasibility studies of the project were submitted to technicians of the downstream riparian
states.128
In the late of 1964, it was held a meeting with the participation of experts from the riparian
states. During this meeting, the Turkish delegation argued that it was difficult to reach a final
equation for water to be released from the reservoir prior to impounding the dam. This is due to
natural circumstances that would prevail during the filling, and on the particular assessment of
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the concerned states’ needs.129
In the early 1974, Turkey began filling the Keban reservoir resulting in a reduction of the amount
flow. There was not reached an agreement at the end of several technical meetings, whereas the
three riparian states went their own ways in determining filling system for the two reservoirs.
This period was full of hassle and congestion out of the dispute among the riparian states of
different political directions. Iraq accused Syria of decreasing the water flow, whereas Syrian
government placed the accusation on Turkish side. Finally, Syria agreed to allow an additional
flow to Iraq.130
The following year, Iraq argued that the normal flow had been decreased and asked for the
intervention of the Arab league. Prior to mutual arguments, technical committee was formed to
mediate the dispute. Syria provided that the normal amount flow did not reach its borders during
this year due to continuous dry weather. Iraq was not convinced with the Syrian argument and
accumulating blames resulted in mutual threats.131The mediation of Saudi Arabia was succeeded
to breakdown the increasing cognition reaching an agreement that forbidden the impending
violence and concluded that fifty eight percent of the Euphrates waters coming from Turkey
would be released to Iraq by Syria.
The rapid implementation of the Turkey's Southeast Anatolia Project (known as Guneydogu
Anadolu Projesi “GAP” in Turkish) accelerated the debates of conflictive nature among the
Euphrates basin. The GAP Project is a multi sector that includes irrigation, hydraulic energy,
agriculture, urban infrastructure, education and health sectors.132 The water resources
development dimension of the project consists of the construction of twenty two dams, fourteen
hydropower projects on the Euphrates basin, and nineteen hydraulic power plants.133 In the late
of 1970, Turkey started to implement the Southeastern Anatolian Project that border Syria and
Iraq.134 According to the GAP administration, the dams that form part of the GAP project would
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be used to irrigate a total of 1.7 million hectares of land.135The first dam to be built under GAP
was the Karakaya Dam (constructed 1976-1987) on the Euphrates.136 Other dams have quickly
followed - the Ataturk Dam (1983-92), the Karkamis Dam (1996-1999) and most recently the
Birecik Dam (1993-2000). 137 The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have
supported such large-budget projects.138
The analysis of popular journals can give plausible explanation about the conflictive relations
over trans-boundary rives and the zero sum game of the concerning debates. While Turkey
sources reflect that this project is important for the whole region, both Syria and Iraq represent
their water rights.
Both Iraq and Syria argue that in the light of the UN watercourses convention, Turkey should
have informed them before developing such a huge project that impacts the Euphrates basin.
Additionally, they have raised concerns over reduced flows that will lead to increased salination
levels in formerly irrigated areas, as was observed after the completion of the Karakaya dam.
Downstream food security and water supplies will be negatively affected by new dams and
reservoirs.
Syria and Iraq demanded more water to be released, while Turkey declined their demands in
order to form the dam reservoirs. Syrian officials estimate that the downstream flow of the
Euphrates as it crosses the Syrian boundaries will be reduced from thirty to sixty percent.
According to the Iraqi authorities “Such a big shortage in the Euphrates river resources will have
grave repercussions for Iraq. The majority of Iraq's population depends on the river to meet their
water needs, agricultural requirements and others”.139
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In addition, the reduced flow also will be negatively affected on power generation. In the light of
the facts, Turkey cannot validly argue the dominant share of the Euphrates River. To conclude
this part, the dynamics of changes in water rights reflects the behavioral changes in state
relations. I observed that state interactions and the explanation for behavioral changes of riparian
states cannot be revealed without the analysis of state identities and national interest of economic
development. Conflictive meanings have been intertwined to trans-boundary rivers, which in
turn have become a source of tension between independent upstream and downstream states.
3. The implication of political atmosphere upon water rights: The historical period between
1980s and 1990s:
The impact of political tension between riparian states is a significant component in freshwater
disputes. A number of water disputes have occurred among the riparian states during the period
of 1980 and 1990 that was linked to political tensions among riparian states. Since the first half
of the 1990, the relation between the riparian states has witnessed a potential link between water
issues and instability of political relations. Tensions between Turkey, Syria and Iraq were raised
due to the GAP project. The construction of dozens of hydropower projects in the Euphrates
basin has given Turkey the ability to unilaterally control most water flow of the Euphrates. A
conflict did suddenly become a very real possibility in 1990.Turkey decided to intervene
temporarily the flow of the Euphrates water in order to impound the Ataturk reservoir, which
considers a central project in the Southeastern Anatolian Project.
In 1996, Turkey began the construction of the Birecik dam, a part of the Anatolian Project, in the
Euphrates basin. Both Syria and Iraq sent official notes to the Turkish government in 1996. They
indicate their objection to the project because it would affect the quantity and quality of waters
flowing to Syrian and Iraqi territory.140
As well, the issues of water and Kurdish issue linkage marked political relations between Syria
Iraq, and Turkey. Turkey used the GAP project as a trump card to solve the Kurdish issue in the
region. In the recent history, the Kurdish question becomes a key issue of hostility.141 As the
largest minority ethnic group, they have been struggling for more rights. The Kurdish people are
major populations in Iraq, Syria, as well as Turkey. The power vacuum of the Kurdish rebels in
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Northern Iraq after the Gulf War emerged serious drawbacks for the Turkish struggle with the
Kurdistan Workers’ Party “PKK”, which is the largest Kurdish party in Turkey. Military tensions
rose between Turkey and Iraq as Turkey invaded northern Iraq to attack Kurdish rebels in
1997.142 On the other hand, Turkey has accused Syria for supporting the PKK, which is fighting
for Kurdish rights in the region. Turkey and Syria were at the edge of war when Turkey
threatened military action if Syria continued to support the Kurdish rebels.
The political impact behind the GAP project has been influential on Turkey’s relations with
Syria and Iraq. Turkey has made a number of statements that asserting the principle of “first
come, first served” in the Euphrates basin. In 1992, Turkey’s Prime Minister stated: "Neither
Syria nor Iraq can lay claim to Turkey's rivers any more than Ankara could claim their oil.
This is a matter of sovereignty. We have a right to do anything we like. The water resources are
Turkey's; the oil resources are theirs. We do not say we share their oil resources, and they cannot
share our water resources."143 However, the analogy made by Turkey does not work effectively
as it denies the obligation of reasonable use imposed upon shared oil fields. In the light of these
conditions the Turkish approach must not be the right track. Turkey has multiple sources other
than the Euphrates River that comprises approximately forty five percent of the total water
resources available to turkey. On the other side, the Euphrates River compromise about eighty
percent of water resources of Syrian territory and ninety five percent of the water surface to
Iraq.144
4. The catalyst of political issues and its impact upon water rights: the historical period
between 1990s-2000s:
Since the second half of the 1990, relations between riparian states in the Euphrates basin have
been dominated by peaceful resolution of disputes. Since the end of 1998, there was a major
change from hostile to cooperation in the external policies of the bilateral relations between
Turkey, Syria and Iraq. The underlying reasons of political change can be related to bilateral and
regional incentives. At the bilateral relations level, the most important turning point in Turkish
external policies towards Syria and Iraq in general was the capture of Kurdistan Workers’ Party
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leader Ocalan in 1999.145 Syria abandoned the support for Ocalan. There was a new shift toward
a degree of cooperation between Syria and Turkey as a result it was signed a new cooperative
treaty. Adana treaty ended the Syrian support for the Kurdish repels and removed one of the
greatest burdens in the Turkish-Syrian relations and enhanced relations concerning water
issues.146
Despite Turkey reluctance, in the past, from having direct contacts with Kurdish authorities in
Iraq, the contacts between Turkey and Kurdish authorities have increased. Turkey realized that in
order to achieve its external policies ambition, it should start to act in line with the current reality
within Iraqi territory.147 Instead of relying on military means to overcome the threat of terrorism
from northern Iraq, Turkey has intensified its contacts with Kurdish authorities in
Iraq.148Political incentives translated into adopting a number of cooperative shared water
agreements between the riparian states.
According to regional level, Turkey has conflicted between its development desires and its needs
to appear to be peaceful neighbor. Turkey aimed to pursue an identity that would connect it to
Turkey aimed to join the European Union. The continuous refusals of the European Union made
Turkey to search for other ways to connect it to the European communities. As a part of this
campaign, Turkish government made an offer to sell electricity to both Syrian and Iraqi
territory.149
The behavioral change of Turkey was expressed by signing cooperative agreements regarding
Euphrates basin. However, these bilateral accords were interim measures, which were largely
products of the fluctuated political atmosphere in the Euphrates basin. These agreements have
not served the aim of applying equitable use and water sharing.150 The cooperative accords have
shortcomings in engaging political, economic, and geographic reality. Water flow in the
Euphrates basin has been subject to severe fluctuations.
The changing geographical conditions were not taken into consideration in either
accord. Moreover, these bilateral agreements did not comprise terms to deal with the growing
social and economic needs that engage the whole Euphrates states. Additionally, Turkey requires
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external funds in order to finalize the Southern Anatolia Project. Turkey’s own investment in
Southern Anatolia project has damaged its economy contributing to severe inflation and massive
public debt. Following the economic crisis in 2001 and a planned expansion of the project,
Turkey cannot longer internally fund the project.
The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund decided not to fund any part of Southern
Anatolia Project due to concerns of the conflict among states and environmental impacts.
However, potential external funding agencies, such as the European Union and World Bank,
require an agreement with downstream riparian states before they will offer fund.
5. The impact of the legal domain in water politics: The historical period between 1940s
and 2000s:
The legal context of the Euphrates basin is shaped by several bilateral agreements. The principal
ones are an accord between Syria and Turkey specifies the minimum average flow at the SyrianTurkish border; and an agreement between Iraq and Syria determines the allocation of Euphrates
water between those two states. Riparian states hold conflictive positions on legal principles of
the UN water convention.
a. Bilateral agreements between the riparian states:
The Euphrates is subject to bilateral agreements between the three riparian states. After Iraq
gained independence from the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and Iraq signed a comprehensive
agreement in 1946, which aimed at strengthening the neighborly cooperation between the two
states.151The agreement acknowledges the importance of cooperation, sharing of information and
the need for consultation for mutual benefits of both states. This period is characterized by
general state mutual relations. In the meantime, there was not an extensive development of the
Euphrates basin. The historical agreements signed during that period determined state boundaries
and general state mutual relations between Syria and Turkey. On the whole, state relations over
the Euphrates basin were not competitive.
During the period between 1960 to the early of 1980, it was marked by political instability and
unilateral developments of hydropower projects among the Euphrates basin states. The rare
cooperative schemes of this period were not translated into comprehensive agreements.
Several agreements were signed about water regulations since 1987. Syria signed the Protocol on
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Economic Cooperation with Turkey specifying the minimum average flow at the Syrian-Turkish
border in 1987.152It is an interim agreement on water quantity which states that an annual 16
BCM (500 m3/s) is to be released at the Syrian-Turkish border. This protocol established a fixed
minimum water flow that should be allowed to Syria. In contrast to the preceding protocol, Iraq
and Syria signed an agreement in 1990 that determines the allocation of Euphrates water between
those two states according to a fixed ratio of Forty-two percent to Syria and fifty-eight percent to
Iraq. Therefore, if there is less water available in Syria, Iraq receives less.153
Cooperation over water was expressed in several accords since 1990. Turkey and Iraq signed
several agreements to strengthen their political ties. The Memorandum of Understanding on
water signed in 2009 is one of forty eight Memorandum of Understanding signed between
Turkey and Iraq.154 Both sides agreed to share hydrological and technical information and
exchange expertise regarding the Euphrates River. On the other hand, several steps for increasing
cooperation in Turkish relations with Syrian government were introduced in 2009.155 The Turkey
Syrian Strategic Cooperation Council agreement addresses collective activities in the field of
water such as the improvement of water quality, the construction of water pumping stations and
joint dams as well as the development of joint water policies.156
Tensions did not end with the signing of the bilateral agreements. Although these attempt to
reach a degree of cooperation, the three riparian states still need to conclude a shared convention.
The controversy concerned the basin flow is still a cornerstone in negotiations a shared
convention among the three riparian states. In addition, it should be noted that a shared
understanding of the respective duties and obligations of the riparian states as well as objective
definitions of such needs are a prerequisite for sustaining the negotiation development.
Consequently, the main guidance for the Euphrates riparian states is the UN water courses
convention.
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b. States position toward legal norms of the UN watercourses convention:
Although specific geographical, political, and economic contexts no doubt shape the legal
discourse, the equitable principle is advanced by the Euphrates riparian states. However, the
three riparian states hold conflictive positions on how to weight the different criteria when
determining an equitable use. Both Syria and Iraq argue that they have acquired rights pertaining
to prior uses. In addition, the downstream states argue that the right of equitable use finds its
limitation in the duty not cause significant harm to the neighboring riparian states. In contrast,
Turkey claims that water should be allocated according to the needs of each riparian state.157
In fact, Turkey wanted to safeguard the successful completion of the GAP project. Riparian
states pursue an approach that they expect the utmost benefits from their situations. Apparently,
there is no norm to follow in determining the priority of uses. The UN water courses convention
leaves up to riparian states to agree on criteria of water sharing.
No doubt that the underlying problem is not in the legal domain solely, but states are insisting on
their respective positions. A convention among the three countries is needed to deal properly
with the water distribution. This stage requires an external intervention to the parties together
because the countries have thus far failed to initiate successful convention among all the riparian
states. On occasion, States have initiated bilateral talks, but that is insufficient to begin
discussions for a regional agreement. A mediator, on the other hand, can often work more
directly to create conditions of ripeness and can convince the parties that the path to achieving
their preferred unilateral solutions is blocked, and, at the same time, offer them a credible,
mutually beneficial alternative solution.
It should be determined the actual needs of all the riparian states of the Euphrates basin within a
comprehensive institutional setting. Growing networks of water dialogue at both the
governmental and nongovernmental levels should continue to serve as open channels for easing
the tensions due to the fluctuation of political relations among the riparian states in recent times.
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To sum up, I conclude that the Euphrates case reveals that identities as rooted perceptions about
self and others constitute national interests. I explored how states have sought to perceive transboundary rivers that undermine economic domain, political relations, and geographical
demarcation. I argue that linkage between state relations, identities and national interests can
give deeper insight about the cooperative and competitive nature of trans-boundary rivers.
While realism views the Euphrates case as inherently competitive, liberalism focuses on the
cooperative opportunities offered by the perceived common national interests of the states.
Materialist approaches cannot explain why states in the Euphrates case decided to prioritize
common interests in some periods and why they turned to competitive pursuit of national
interests in other periods.
There is a main distinction in the understanding of state interests between materialist approaches
and constructivist. In essence, constructivist approach does not take state interests as given. From
a constructivist viewpoint, national interests are constructed on the basis of identities. National
interests in the constructivist approach are the product requirements of state identities. With this
conclusion, the case of the Euphrates River supports my main argument that a constructivist
approach determines the behavioral changes attached to trans-boundary rivers. To get deep
evidence about whether the constructivist approach can give plausible explanations about
behavioral change of state relations, I present the Indus basin in the following section.
D. The case of Indus River:
Historically, Increasing water demands, irrigation, and political instability were the core issues
represented in the Indus basin. The roots of water dispute can be traced to the independence of
India and Pakistan in 1947. Prior to partition of Indus states, the Indus River was evolved by the
British to function as an integrated unit; but the intensive water uses by the independent states of
India and Pakistan have since been split in two. I argue that state relations between India and
Pakistan are determined by structures of irrigation economies, geographical demarcation, and
political boundaries. These patterns are deeply rooted in relative stable but not static relations. I
explore how the interaction between these static variables can lead to changing behavior. The
Indus Waters Treaty illustrates the importance of effective mechanisms for water allocation to
have the flexibility in responding to social and environmental changes. In that sense it considered
as a success.
1. The geographical feature of the Indus case:
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The Indus River is a major river in North West India and Pakistan. The river originates from the
southwestern Tibet Autonomous Region of China, and crosses the southeastern boundary of
Kashmir region through Pakistani territory in the south and finally flows out into the Arabian
Sea.158 The Indus River has two main tributaries, the Kabul on the west bank and the Punjab on
the east. Still, the Indus receives its most notable tributaries from the Eastern Punjab Plain in
India. These tributaries are often referred to the name of Punjab, which means Five Rivers of
Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej. These rivers rises in Indian Punjab and run into
Pakistan.159
On the whole, after receiving the waters of Punjab Rivers, the Indus becomes much wider, which
cross the plain in western and southern Punjab province. The west bank of Kabul rises in
Afghanistan and flows through the Peshawar valley to join Indus at Attock.160 The Indus basin
drains the highlands of Afghanistan, India, Pakistan, and the autonomous Region of Tibet in the
people’s republic of China. The main states interested in the river basin development are India
and Pakistan. China had not at that time withdrawn any water from the Indus River. Within
India, the Indus Basin lies in Kashmir and Eastern Punjab.161
In the case of Pakistan, the Indus basin lies in Western Punjab and Sind. The competition
between India and Pakistan was over the Punjab waters, mainly, the Sutlej river located in
Kashmir. The Sutlej River provides the main drainage system for Pakistan. The Sutlej River
flows through India crossing a small pocket of Pakistan before re-entering India.162 The Indus
basin is principally fed by the melting of snow in the Himalayan catchment areas as well as
precipitation in the mountains regions.
Approximately sixty-nine percent of the Indus River is originated in India compared to nineteen
percent for Pakistan and twelve percent for Tibet and Afghanistan.163 On general speaking, the
Indus Basin is characterized by a major fluctuation on seasonal basis.
2. The economic pattern in the Indus case:
158

AQUASTAT Survey, Irrigation in Southern and Eastern Asia in figures, Food and Agriculture organization of
United Nations,(2011). Available at
www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/.../Indus/indus_bp.pdf
159
Id.
160
Jeremy Allouche, Water Nationalism, An Explanation of the Past and Present conflicts in Central Asia, the
Middle East and The Indian Subcontinent? A thesis presented to Genève University, (2005).
http://www.transboundarywaters.orst.edu/publications/abst_docs/related_research/allouche2005.pdf
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id.

47

Although irrigation in the Indus valley has been practiced since time immortal, it is mainly with
the arrival of British that irrigation took another stage. Techniques of irrigation were modernized
and large scale irrigation was captured the waters of the Indus River. During the British
administration, the Indus River, mainly the most cultivated area of Punjab province, was seen as
an economic path to expand British control over the region against the growing empire of Russia
in central Asia. The expansion of irrigation extended into an immense network of canals.164 The
resulting revenue from agricultural products proved sufficient incentive to overcome the high
costs of canals construction.
Although the provinces were controlled by the British, there was not an integrated development
policy. 165The increasing development of the Indus region raised the competition between Punjab
and other provinces. The Punjab considered being the main area of canal building. During that
period, there was not water storage that leads to little hydro-electric development. Each province
built its own works independently, despite their reliance upon the same source of water,
principally the Sutlej River.166
At the same vein, the British administration constructed a rotational system, whereby, when a
canal was closed for any temporarily reasons, any available water could be transferred to another
canal. 167The entire canals were dependent on the varying natural flow of the Indus River. The
arbitrariness construction of irrigation facilities led to an increased competition between
upstream Punjab and other provinces mainly Sind.
Despite there were attempts for negotiations during British administration, the provinces could
not reach common ground resolutions. The British involvement in the Second World War has
weakened its power on its provinces. Water negotiations were continued till the independence of
Pakistan and India in the late 1940.168The new states of India and Pakistan struggled to define
not only their new national identity, but also to demarcate their national territory, the question of
territory rose to the forefront of Indus dispute negotiations. Difficulties in deciding where the
international demarcation between Eastern and western Punjab would lie were linked to the
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integrated nature of the canal system and the high dependence of agriculture in the two halves of
Punjab on the irrigation system. The root reasons of the Indian- Pakistan dispute really emerge
from the way that British had managed the Indus River.
Since independence, the new frontiers cut across the Punjab Rivers ended up being allocated to
Pakistan. The international demarcation pays little attention for the constructed irrigation canals.
India could gain control over the water of Pakistan’s canals by diverting water to its own
territory. Therefore, the reduction of the quantity of water in the Indus River had a severe
implication upon the economy of Pakistan. Following partition, approximately two thirds of the
irrigated areas located in Pakistan.169
The demarcation of borders left ten of the canal system in Pakistan and two in India.170
Nevertheless, the demarcation gave Indian Territory control over the headwaters. Consequently,
the inequitable distribution of development in the Indus basin become a main cause of hostile
between the newly nation states.171
In addition, urban water supply and floods was a matter of contention in the two riparian states.
Based on these findings, State sovereignty and nation building have become the major concern
of Pakistan and India. The emerging interests of the competing new nations have been perceived
competitive and irreconcilable. I contend that state relations during this era are intertwined with
the inter-subjective processes related to the concepts of state identity and economic concern. A
number of Pakistan newspaper emphasized that the historical legal rights of Pakistan.172 For
example, Pakistan Times believed that Pakistan involvement to negotiations was a foregone of
historic rights. This process had essential consequences on the formation of citizens’ perception,
which in turn had very significant implication at the international levels. Thus, I argue that
domestic and international identities should not be treated separately.
3. The political domain of the Indus Basin:
since the independence of the sub-continent into India and Pakistan, the relationship between
these neighbors had shadowed with a feeling of “mutual distrust”.173 A number of factors,
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including a bitter partition that deeply seated in ideological distinction, and the continuing
conflict in Kashmir were threatened the stability of the newly nation states. The two-nation
theory was the engine behind the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947. This theory, at its core,
refers to the religious, and nationalism differences between the two major nations are.174
The two nation- theory supported the proposal that Muslims and Hindus should be two separate
nations. These dissimilarities largely were instrumental in giving rise to distinct political
ideologies, which were responsible for the partition of Indian continent into two independent
states.
Kashmir has been another source of tension between India and Pakistan since independence.175
After Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh, ruler of the Muslim majority state decided to integrate
Kashmir as part of India. His decision led to an Indo-Pakistani war in 1948 and to the division of
the province after the 1949 ceasefire.176 The Kashmir dispute is frequently analyzed through the
dimension of conflicting ideologies, the underlying perception being that India and Pakistan both
consider Kashmir as an inherent part of their identity.
The Kashmir problem revolved around three forces: religious nationalism represented by
Pakistan, secular nationalism articulated by India, and ethnic nationalism embodied in perception
of Kashmiri. Pakistan perceived that Hindus and Muslims were not only two different religious
communities, but also two separate nations.177 Pakistan perceived that Kashmir, being a Muslim
majority state, should have integrated to it at the time of partition.
On the other hand, India ensured a secular polity since independence. India's national movement
did not accept the two-nation theory, where Hindus and Muslims had separate religions but they
were not different nations. In particular, the assassination of Mahatma Gandhi in 1948 by a
Hindu fanatic emphasized the approach of secularists within the government. From Kashmiri
state view, Kashmiri nationalism is not based on religion but on a separate Kashmiri ethnicity.
Kashmir composed of three ethnically separable geographical regions.178 The ethnic groups are
Dogra Hindu-majority Jammu, a Muslim-major Kashmir, and a Tibetan Buddhist-majority
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Ladakh.179 However, this view is internally inconsistent because non-Kashmiri groups might not
wish to join such a state.
Another dimension of the dispute is that Kashmir contains water resources water reservoir which
both nations rely on. Consequently, it is not only the territory itself, but the water resources that
include. All in all, the examined period was featured by identity construction. The process of
constructing the perception of “self” and “other” are of the core importance, therefore, state
building process that encompassed the interests of Pakistan and Indian raised the competition
between them.
4. The implication of conflictive perceptions between India and Pakistan:
I contend that excessive development never exists outside politics. Rather, these extensive
developments always produced within ongoing political conflicts. To portray the issue of
conflictive identities in terms of water dispute, India stopped water flow to Pakistan in 1948.180
This action was criticized by Pakistani government and started negotiations with India on water
supply.
India agreed upon a provisional treaty called Inter Dominion agreement with Pakistan by mid
1948. The agreement allowed for reopening the canals of Eastern Rivers for irrigation purposes
until the Pakistan regulated new alternative water resources.181
Therefore, Pakistan would make annual payments to Indian Territory and would not claim any
sovereign rights upon water.182 Soon, the legal status of the document signed on 4 May 1948
became a contentious issue. Pakistan formally terminated the agreement and proposed that the
dispute be referred to the International Court of Justice, but India refused legal resolution of
arbitration because India will lose its international reputation.183
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With tensions rising between India and Pakistan, the need for impartial third party intervention
was apparent. Despite a legal third party was rejected by India, an alternative intervener was
becoming crucial.184
In October 1949, the Indian Prime Minister had invited David Lilienthal, who was public official
best known for leading the the Atomic Energy Commission, states that “India and Pakistan were
on the verge of war over Kashmir. There seemed to be no possibility of negotiating this issue
until tensions abated. One way to reduce hostility…. Would be to concentrate on other important
issues where cooperation was possible. Progress in these areas would promote a sense of
community between the two nations, which might, in time, lead to a Kashmir settlement.
Accordingly, I proposed that India and Pakistan would work out a program jointly to develop
and jointly to operate the Indus Basin river system, upon which both nations were dependent for
irrigation water. With new dams and irrigation canals, the Indus and its tributaries could be made
to yield the additional water each country needed for increased food production. In the article, I
had suggested that the World Bank might use its good offices to bring the parties to agreement,
and help in the financing of an Indus Development program.”185
5. The Path for a successful resolution:
Following David Lilienthal’s proposal plan to solve the dispute between India and Pakistan,
Eugene Black, the World Bank President, offered the good offices of the bank to settle the
dispute. The available evidence seems to suggest that if the distribution of water resources
between India and Pakistan was remained unresolved. It would hinder the development of
irrigation, and contribute to reduction of agriculture, which was the backbone of the region’s
economy. With this intention, both India and Pakistan accepted the assistance of the World
Bank. The interests of both states to engage into negotiations can be summarized as follows:
While India’s motivation was to expand water uses; Pakistan interest was to safeguard its
existing uses. In the first place, the World Bank suggested that a working group appointed by
each state to jointly prepare a comprehensive plan for the integrated management of the Indus
Basin.186
The World Bank called each party to present its version of a plan. In the years 1952-1954, India
and Pakistan was reluctant to accept that the Indus Basin should be developed as an integrated
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unit. In the late of 1953, the mistrust between the two states made it clear that the dream of
integral management of the Indus Basin was simply not functional.
In February 1954, the World Bank presented its own proposal in order to overcome the
impasse.187 It comprised three main suggestions. Firstly, historic withdrawals must be continued,
but not necessarily from the same sources.188 Secondly, the three eastern rivers were assigned to
India and the three western rivers to Pakistan.189
Thirdly, Pakistan would have a transition period of ten years to construct link canals to allow
replacement of water supplies from the eastern rivers.190 Finally, Pakistan accepted the Bank’s
proposals in July 1954 but added a suggestion that it would be possible to effect reasonable
adjustments.191 The Bank recognized Pakistan’s limited storage and the need for the maximum
utilization of the waters of the western rivers. The economic incentives were the drive force for
converging identities.
By dividing the Indus River, economic domain was not perceived anymore as a threat. By
applying the constructivist approach, state relations between India and Pakistan were cooperative
based on their common national interests. I evaluated how the changes in state relations are
intertwined with economic interests and the perception of state identity. I found that relations
between India and Pakistan shifted toward cooperation after they became independent
economically. The underlying interests in the Indus case represent mainly in the economic
dimension. Because of this perception, concepts of cooperation became attached to the meanings
of trans-boundary waters.
6. Indus Waters Treaty: dividing or sharing the Indus Basin system:
According to the Indus Water Treaty, the basin would be allocated not according to quantity, but
in terms of streams. Therefore, Pakistan had the right to use the Indus main-stream and the two
western tributaries, while India had an exclusive right to use of the three eastern tributaries. In
contrast to the integral management principle, this division did not require a cooperative scheme
between the riparian states in the management of the river. There is a rapidly growing literature
on the success of the Indus Waters Treaty.
I put forward the view that the peaceful settlement was reached by changing the factual reality of
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the Indus basin. To illustrate this idea, I employ the ground incentives of the distribution
formula. At first glance, not only the Indus dispute was a matter of the Western rivers only, but
also included the whole Indus Basin. Aside from a matter of quantity, Pakistan insisted to
maintain supplies to existing uses with its territory. The most developed areas of Western Punjab
were mainly supplied from the Eastern Rivers. To transform the source of the water supply
would require expensive costs to construct replacement water infrastructure from the Western
Rivers. Along similar lines, Pakistan was not keen to afford additional expenses, as Pakistan
claims that it has a legal right to protect its existing uses.
On the other hand, while India strived to contribute to the least possible costs to Pakistan’s
canals infrastructure, India aimed to expand the irrigated area in the Sutlej River. The Bank
recognized the practical reality of the Indus Basin.
The World Bank aimed to change Pakistan’s perception regarding its dependence on the Eastern
Rivers. In doing so, the World Bank offered financial assistance to construct new water storage
facilities. The World Bank sponsored several rounds of negotiations until reaching an agreement.
The Indus Waters Treaty was signed between Pakistan and India in 1960. At the same time, the
World Bank agreed to create an Indus Basin Development in collaboration with Australia,
Canada, Germany, New Zealand, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, the United States. The Indus
Basin Fund would assist of almost US$900 million to finance the construction water canals in
Pakistan.192
I admit that the Indus Waters Treaty was practically a successful resolution. However, the treaty
has strengthened the distinctive location of Kashmir since the western rivers flowed through the
disputed province and considered a threat to Pakistan independence. The Indus waters Treaty
illustrate a good start point towards cooperation between states. On the basis of the evidence
currently available, I confirm that the World Bank was able to overturn the competitive relations
between India and Pakistan, regarding Indus River through two significant solutions. The Bank
aimed to directly mitigate the negotiation process to manage the water resources, as well as to
offer economic incentives to resolve the water allocation dilemma. The Indus system was not an
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integrated management; it formulates a means for information sharing, a joint commission with
equal representation, and a conflict resolution mechanism.
This provision entitles a balance between the construction of development projects and state
independence. Nevertheless, the provisions in Indus Waters Treaty are broadly adopted and
granted India the right to construct water storage facilities in its territorial of Eastern rivers. In
recent times, such projects would restrain natural flow of Indus River. Although I am aware of
this shortcoming of the Indus Water Treaty provisions, my objective is to tease out factors that
lead to the behavioral change of state relations during that time. It is inconsistent to think of
current-day society as primarily static over time. In fact, history has a significant role in the
polarization of state identities and their interests. Consequently, I assume that the identified state
interests can mitigate any future scenarios in the international relations basin.
The consequence can be drawn that the constructivist approach can make a contribution in the
understanding of state relations by analyzing different historical periods. Prior independence of
Indian nations, the perceptions of India and Pakistan were conflictive. It was a period of
transition, and even the physical partition of the states was in question. In the lack of a common
narrative about “the self” and “others” in the international system, state relations between India
and Pakistan were competitive. Consequently, conflictive state relations were accompanied with
competitive behavior attached to international rivers as well. In the second period, the main
derived interest was the economic domain. Therefore, in spite of the conflictive identities of
India and Pakistan, neutral state relations prevailed regarding trans-boundary rivers. There is a
potential link between state identities, national interests, and state relations. Given the centrality
of this issue to my claim, I contend that the constructivist approach can make an added value in
identifying the behavioral change of states regarding international rivers.
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V. Synopsis of experience: Toward a peaceful resolution:
In the first place, water disputes are settled through various diplomatic means such as
negotiations, consultation, good offices, mediation, the use of joint bodies and institutions.
Legal means of arbitration and adjudication is the last channel to resolve international water
disputes. Principally, mediation is the optimum track to resolving disputes of international rivers
because engaged parties determine the shape and nature of the outcome of mediation process.
For instance, it seems that India's political will was formulated by the perception that the
International Court of Justice would damage its position in the dispute, and the World Bank
could potentially benefit it. This is useful because it increases the chances of reaching an
agreement that satisfies the disputing parties' interests. Or at least, it will decrease tensions
among riparian states.
In the Indus case, the mediation of third party raise states will for a peaceful resolution of the
water disputes. As Jacob Bercovitch has pointed out “The reality of mediation is that of a
complex, changing and dynamic interaction mediator who does have some resources and an
interest in the dispute or its outcome and disputing parties and their representatives.” 193
Obviously, the whole process of mediation is voluntary. Once the third party is allowed to
intervene, attention is focused upon the issues underlying the dispute. In order to keep the talks
on track, all parties needed to know what issues in a dispute are. Not only was it crucial for the
mediator to understand the underlying reasons of a dispute, but the riparian states themselves
needed to be aware of each other's perceptions.
The most important variable in the Indus case is the economic dimension that leads to successful
road toward the Indus agreement. The mediator made an effort to determine interests of India
and Pakistan clearly. The essential variable in the Indus case is the economic factor. The Political
instability between India and Pakistan did not constrain the cooperative scheme. By determining
interests of riparian states, they can reach a degree of cooperation. This factor can be used to
describe the successful case of the Indus Waters Treaty. This approach can be applied successful
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in the case of Euphrates basin. According to the Euphrates case, the development of hydro power
projects on the two rivers has been a source of growing tension between the riparian states.
By allowing the disputing parties the chance to cooperate, or at least to weight the costs of
cooperation, it can change the disputing parties' perceptions of each sufficiently to reach an
acceptable solution. Disputing parties have agendas, which they wish to satisfy.
Mediation is an effective process in which disputing states can start directly in discussing their
agendas without having to return to dispute.194In addition, mediation assists the parties in
reaching a common ground that fits these agendas.195
In practical terms, mediation process should be impartial and only assess the situation for the
benefit of the disputing parties.196 By peaceful settlement, it offers a development diplomacy,
which expands economic growth without regard to the political needs and agendas of any one
given state. This is not to say that the mediator does not have reasons for having entered in the
process, and then staying. However, these reasons should not be imposed upon the final treaty, if
one arises.
The national interests of states in question are willing to explore common ground of incentives,
particularly economic incentives between riparian states, then cooperation will be more likely.
The development incentive helped in resolving the Indus dispute. Moreover, The Public
participation played a central role in resolving the dispute to build up shared understandings.
These negotiators were able to balance different interests. Participation should include a variety
of interest groups. The availability of both scientific and experiential knowledge was useful in
achieving a mutually acceptable resolution.
There is a common path for degree of cooperation is left between competitive parties based upon
economic approach. The economic principle of the distribution of water resources according to
its economic value could be a suitable resolution.197 It should be differentiated between the
efficient allocation of water to its highest value use and equity the distribution of gains from an
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allocation.198 Water sharing should take into consideration the possibility of increasing the
overall efficiency of water utilization by re allocating the water according to these values. This
principle alone may not be accepted as equitable, or fair, by the parties involved. However,
inclusion of economic aspects in water resource allocation may enhance better cooperation and
future collaboration among riparian states. Beneficial uses describe the efficient allocation of
scarce water resources among competing users.199 For instance, water pricing policy can play a
major role in effective allocation.
The cost of using water in the production of food or industrial goods can be measured in
economic scheme.200 In addition, the cost of providing water to produce a certain product can be
compared across sectors, mainly agriculture and industry. This could encourage their allocation
of water away from low value water products either by changing sectors or, for instance, by
planting crops that demand a higher price on the market. The high cost of producing certain low
value foods such as grains could encourage governments to buy the food on the international
market rather than produce it locally.
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VI.

Conclusion:

The flow behavior of international rivers has been altered by the major projects of hydropower
projects. Competition over water resources has prompted fears that water issues contain the seeds
of violent dispute. This thesis has evaluated the constructivist approach regarding trans-boundary
rivers. The thesis has revealed that the competitive and cooperative nature of international rivers
is really the outcome of the issues of state identities and interests and social construction of
public participation. State relations are deeply inherited in relatively stable but not static
structures of history, geographical features, political relations, and economic development.
These factors have assisted to reshape both the identities and interests of state actors moving
them toward cooperative behavior. This thesis admitted that the economic dimension can be used
in settling competition over international rivers. It can be used as a means to set the conflicting
players in a mode of cooperation and coordination. In essence, the economic aspect can help
states to address their shared water needs peacefully. This approach assumes that the economic
identity of states represents a window of opportunity and cooperation among riparian states.
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